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Recent Cases
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT- BOTH SWORD AND SHIELD
IN MISSOURI
State ex rel. Pulliam v. Swink'
* Defendant was involved, in an automobile collision in which the
driver of the other vehicle was killed. The wife of the deceased filed suit
for the wrongful death of her husband. Defendant's answer generally
denied the plaintiff's allegations and asserted contributory negligence as
a defense. Both parties appeared at the appointed time for the taking of
depositions. The plaintiff's deposition was taken first and she answered
all questions. The defendant was then sworn and plaintiff's counsel began
to take his deposition. The defendant gave only his name and address and
thereafter refused to answer any questions on the ground that to do so
might incriminate him. At trial, the plaintiff moved to strike the defend-
ant's answer pursuant to section 491.180, RSMc, 1969, which provides:
If a party, on being duly summoned, refuse [sic] to attend and
testify, either in court or before any person authorized to take his
deposition, besides being punished himself as for a contempt, his
petition, answer or reply may be rejected, or a motion, if made by
himself, overruled, or, if made by the adverse party, sustained.
The trial judge indicated his intention to sustain the plaintiff's mo-
tion. The defendant sought and obtained a preliminary writ of prohibi-
tion from the Missouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District. The writ was
transferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri where it was made per-
manent. The court held that where a defendant seeks no affirmative re-
lief and makes a good faith assertion of his constitutional privilege to
remain silent at the first opportunity, a trial court would exceed its juris-
diction if it entered an order striking the defendant's answer.
Although in both the United States and the Missouri constitutions
the privilege against self-incrimination is phrased in terms of criminal pro-
ceedings, the privilege is available to witnesses in both criminal and civil
actions.2 Generally speaking, a penalty may not be imposed against a
party who makes a valid assertion of this privilege.3 However, a majority of
1. 514 S.W.2d 559 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
2. For a general discussion as to the scope and problems of the privilege,
see 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2254-66 (McNaughton rev. 1961); see also State
ex rel. North v. Kirtley, 327 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. En Banc 1959); Morgan, The Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1949).
3. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967); Garnty v. New Jersey, 385 U.S.
493 (1967); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). In none of these cases was the
party seeking any affirmative relief or asserting any affirmative defenses.
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jurisdictions4 have refused to allow either a plaintiff5 or defendant6 to
obtain affirmative relief while refusing to testify on matters which, if
known, might bar the granting of such relief. The rationale behind this
approach is that the fifth amendment was not intended to be "both a
sword and a shield."7
Under this reasoning, the privilege against self-incrimination is an-
alogous to the doctor-patient privilege. A patient has the right to pre-
vent his physician from testifying;s however, this privilege is waived if
the patient files a suit for personal injuries because such a suit places
the patient's physical condition in issue.9 Similarily, if a party's cause of
action is based on facts peculiarly within his knowledge, that party waives
the privilege against self-incrimination as to these facts when he seeks
such affirmative relief.10 The Pulliam court endorsed this reasoning, say-
ing: "It is not unfair to preclude one who invokes the assistance of the
courts from recovery when he refuses to produce evidence peculiarly within
his knowledge pertinent to his right to recover."" The question to be pur-
sued by this note is whether asserting an affirmative defense constitutes
"invoking the assistance of the courts."
Some courts have refused to allow the assertion of an affirmative de-
fense by a defendant who invokes the fifth amendment in connection with
the proceedings. In Rubenstein v. Kleven12 an unmarried woman brought
an action against a married man for breach of a contract under which the
plaintiff was to render companionship and other services to the defendant.
The defendant's answer asserted the illegality of the alleged contract as
a defense. At deposition, the defendant asserted the privilege against self-
incrimination in response to certain questions to which an affirmative
answer might have indicated adultery. The United States District Court
of Massachusetts held that the defendant could not assert the affirmative
defense of illegality, based on a criminal act involving himself, while
claiming the privilege against self-incrimination. The court said further
4. See generally Annot., 4 A.L.R.Sd 545 (1965).
5. Stockham v. Stockham, 168 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1964); Minor v. Minor, 282
So. 2d 746 (Fla. Ct. App. 1970); Franklin v. Franklin, 283 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. En
Banc 1955); Schrad v. Schrad, 186 Neb. 462, 183 N.W.2d 923 (1971); Levine v.
Bornstein, 6 N.Y.2d 462, 160 N.E.2d 921, 190 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1959); see also Note,
28 FoRDnAif L. REv. 557 (1959); Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 426 (1959), both not-
ing the Levine case.
6. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958), reh. den., 356 U.S. 948
(1958); Nuckols v. Nuckols, 189 So. 2d 832 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966); Berner v.
Schlesinger, 175 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1957); Annest v. Annest, 49 Wash. 2d 62, 298 P.2d
485 (1956).
7. See generally Independent Products Corp. v. Lowe's, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266,
277 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Annot., 4 A.L.R.Sd 545 (1965); Annot., 72 A.L.R.2d 818
(1960).
8. § 491.060, RSMo 1969.
9. State ex rel. McNutt v. Keet, 432 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
10. Geldback Transport, Inc. v. Delay, 443 S.W.2d 120, 121 (Mo. 1969).
11. 514 S.W.2d at 561.
12. 150 F. Supp. 47 (D. Mass. 1957).
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that the defendant could not use "the testimony of any witness" or estab-
lish that the acts occured "simply by inference" while claiming the privilege
against self-incrimination.' 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently
upheld the dismissal with prejudice of a defendant's affirmative defenses
and counterclaims where the defendant had refused to answer interroga-
tories on the ground that to do so might incriminate him.14 The decision
was based on a finding of bad faith on the part of the defendant, but
the following language indicates the court's position in relation to the in-
vocation of the fifth amendment by a party asserting an affirmative defense:
[T]he right to assert the privilege does not, a priori, free the
claimant of the responsibility to respond in pre-trial discovery
when information sought bears upon the claimant's own counter-
claim and affirmative defenses.' 5
In Pulliam the Missouri Supreme Court discussed and expressly af-
firmed' 6 Franklin v. Franklin.'7 Franklin was a divorce case in which the
plaintiff wife, relying on the fifth amendment, refused to answer written
interrogatories regarding the status of her previous marriage. This re-
fusal was held to justify striking her pleadings. The court recognized her
right to assert the privilege, but said she may not by virtue of that privilege
obtain affirmative relief.'8
The Pulliam court also expressly affirmed'0 Geldback Transport, Inc.
v. Delay.2 0 Geldback was a replevin action against two defendants wherein
one defendant cross-claimed alleging that he was entitled to possession of
the chattel in question. His co-defendant sought by interrogatories to dis-
cover how and from whom this right to possession was obtained. Follow-
ing the cross-claimant's refusal to answer on the ground that to do so
might incriminate him, the trial court dismissed the cross-claim. The ap-
pellate court affirmed the dismissal on the basis that a party should not
be allowed to seek affirmative relief without disclosing the basis of his
claim.2 '
13. Id. at 48.
14. General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Manufacturing Co., 481 F.2d 1204 (8th
Cir. 1973). The dismissal was based on FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (b) (2), which provides:
[TMhe court in which the action is pending may make such orders in re-
gard to a failure to obey an order to provide discovery as are just, and
among others the following:
C. An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying
further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the
action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment
by default against the disobedient party.
15. 481 F.2d at 1213 (emphasis added).
16. 514 S.W.2d at 561.
17. 283 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. En Banc 1955).
18. Id. at 485.
19. 514 S.W.2d at 561.
20. 443 S.W.2d 120 (Mo. 1969).
21. Id. at 121.
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The affirmation of Franklin and Geldback by the Pulliam court main-
tained the long-standing position of the Missouri Supreme Court that if
the privilege against self-incrimination is asserted by a party seeking af-
firmative relief, the trial court may strike that party's pleadings.22 The
application of this statutory sanction23 is generally held to be within the
discretion of the trial court, to be reversed only in cases of clear abuse.24
Such a striking is not a violation of due process.25 The importance of
Pulliam is that implicit in the court's decision is the concept that a party
is not "invoking the assistance of the courts" when he asserts an affirma-
tive defense. Pulliam stands for the proposition that a party in Missouri
can both plead an affirmative defense and invoke the fifth amendment
during all phases of the proceeding. As pointed out by the dissenting
opinion of Judge Finch,26 the majority's refusal to equate an affirmative
defense with affirmative relief is open to criticism.
The defendant in Pulliam not only denied his own negligence, but
also asserted that the plaintiff's deceased was negligent. Contributory
negligence is an affirmative defense r with the burden of proof on the de-
fendant.2 8 The existence of contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff is a complete bar to his recovery.2 9 Assuming that the defendant
in Pulliam was in fact negligent, there arose in the plaintiff a right of
action, such right being the personal property of the plaintiff.30 Assume
also that, in the absence of contributory negligence, a jury would award
damages of $50,000, thereby assigning a dollar value to his "prop-
erty." If the defendant is successful in establishing a defense of con-
tributory negligence, the plaintiff will be unable to collect any of this
claim. As a practical matter, the defendant is seeking affirmative relief
from the court in the full amount of plaintiff's claim. If the defendant
was seeking a set-off of all or part of plaintiff's claim via a counterclaim,
and at the same time asserting a privilege against self-incrimination as to
some element of his counterclaim, the court would deny him this af-
firmative relief.31 Yet, the court in Pulliam said that absent some bad
faith or waiver on the part of the defendant, a trial court would exceed
its jurisdiction by striking the affirmative defense of contributory negli-
22. Franklin v. Franklin, 283 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. En Banc 1955).
23. § 491.180, RSMo 1969.
24. Graveman v. Huncker, 139 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1940); Frankel v. Hudson,
271 Mo. 495, 196 S.W. 1121 (1917); State v. Buckstead, 399 S.W.2d 622 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1966); State v. Reagan, 382 S.W.2d 426 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964); Kaiser
v. Gardiner, 211 S.W. 883 (St. L. Mo. App. 1919); Dustin v. Farrelly, 81 Mo. App.
380 (1899).
25. Miles v. Armour, 239 Mo. 438, 144 S.W. 424 (1912).
26. 514 S.W.2d at 562.
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 8 (c); Mo. Sup. CT. R. 55.10.
28. Mo. APPR. INST. §§ 32.01-.06 (1969).
29. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 65 at 425 (4th ed. 1971).
30. See generally C.J.S. Property § 9 at 175; Clark v. Baker, 186 Ga. 65, 196
S.E. 750 (1938); Cincinnati v. Hafer, 49 Ohio St. 60, 30 N.E. 197 (1892).
31. Geldback Transport, Inc. v. Delay, 443 S.W.2d 120 (Mo. 1969).
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